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We develop a theory of outsourcing in which there is market power in one factor market (labor) and
no market power in a second factor market (capital). There are two intermediate goods: one labor-intensive
and the other capital-intensive. We show there is always outsourcing in the market allocation when
a friction limiting outsourcing is not too big. The key factor underlying the result is that labor demand
is more elastic, the greater the labor share.  Integrated plants pay higher wages than the specialist producers
of labor-intensive intermediates. We derive conditions under which there are multiple equilibria that
vary in the degree of outsourcing. Across these equilibria, wages are lower the greater the degree of
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In the 1920s, Henry Ford famously built a factory in which the raw materials for steel went
in on one end and ﬁnished automobiles went out the other. Extreme vertical integration like
this is not the fashion today. Ford Motor has in recent years spun oﬀ as i g n i ﬁcant portion
of its parts-making operations as a separate company, and General Motors has done the
same. Within its assembly plants, General Motors is currently trying to outsource janitorial
services and forklift operations to outside contractors.
This paper develops a theory of outsourcing in which the circumstances under which
factors of production can grab rents play the leading role. One factor has some monopoly
power (call this labor) while a second factor does not (call this capital). There are two stages
of production: a labor-intensive task and a capital-intensive task. For example, auto part
production (such as hand soldering of wire harnesses) tends to be labor-intensive, while ﬁnal
assembly of automobiles (with robots and huge machines) tends to be capital-intensive. In
the model, all ﬁrms have the same abilities, so there is no motivation to specialize to exploit
Ricardian comparative advantage. Furthermore, an outsourcing friction is incurred when
the two tasks are not integrated in the same ﬁrm. So, in the absence of any monopoly power
by labor, all ﬁrms are completely integrated, doing the labor-intensive and capital-intensive
tasks as part of the same operation, and the outsourcing friction is avoided. However, if
labor has monopoly power and if the friction is not too large, outsourcing necessarily takes
place, with some ﬁrms specializing in the labor-intensive task and other ﬁrms specializing in
the capital-intensive task.
The mechanism underlying our outsourcing result is simply that labor demand is more
elastic, the greater the labor share of a ﬁrm’s overall factor bill. In particular, the demand of
an integrated ﬁrm is less elastic than the demand of a specialist labor-intensive producer, such
as a janitorial services provider. Therefore, a monopolist selling labor to a labor-intensive
ﬁrm will choose a lower wage than one selling to an integrated plant. This wage diﬀerence is
the force driving the disintegration of production of the high and low labor-intensity tasks.
(But note the wage of a specialist capital-intensive plant is higher than for an integrated
plant. This is a subtlety we return to below.)
The main question that we address with the model is: How are changes in outsourcing re-
lated to changes in wage payments in general equilibrium? Our unambiguous ﬁnding is that
increases in outsourcing go hand in hand with decreases in wage payments. Our result allows
for two forces underlying an increase in outsourcing. The ﬁrst force is a decrease over timein the outsourcing friction. A recent series of papers, including Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), have emphasized the advances
in information and transportation technology that have permitted the separation of tasks
previously required to be part of the same operation. When components are manufactured
by separate operations, information costs must be incurred to ensure that separately pro-
duced components ﬁt together both physically and in a timely production schedule (such as
in just-in-time production). Japanese automobile manufacturers pioneered new ways to co-
ordinate production with suppliers (see Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990) and Mair, Florida,
and Kenney (1988)), and these methods have been adopted by U.S. manufacturers. This is
an example of a decrease in the outsourcing friction. In recent years, there have been inno-
vations in organizational forms and administrative structures, such as professional employer
organizations that facilitate the segmentation of factors of production across diﬀerent ﬁrm
boundary lines. We broadly interpret these innovations as decreases in the friction.
The second force potentially underlying an increase in outsourcing is a positive feedback
between lower wages and more outsourcing. This makes it possible to observe diﬀerent
outcomes over time, even when technological fundamentals do not change. That is, for certain
parameters in our model, there can be multiple equilibria with diﬀerent levels of outsourcing.
When this happens, we show the equilibria can be ordered so that more outsourcing is
associated with lower average wages. Put in another way, an increase in outsourcing can
depress wages in general equilibrium which, in turn, can change incentives so that ﬁrms
want to do more outsourcing, making the original increase in outsourcing self-reinforcing.
We ﬁnd that the possibility of multiple equilibria is contingent on an assumption that rent-
seeking activity (for union rents) absorbs a portion of the labor supply, putting upward
pressure on wages. Our ﬁn d i n gt h a tf o rt h es a m em o d e lp a r a m e t e r sb o t ha no u t s o u r c i n g
and a vertical integration equilibrium might exist is reminiscent of a ﬁnding by McLaren
(2000). But the mechanism and context are completely diﬀerent here.
A premise of this paper is that labor has market power while capital does not. There
are good reasons to accept this premise. Workers can go on strike, and various job market
protections in labor law can enhance labor bargaining power. Perhaps there will come a
day when robots go on strike, but for now, business managers need not worry about capital
walking oﬀ the job. In the formal analysis, we model market power narrowly as taking
the form of a union with a monopoly on labor at the plant level. Our idea applies more
broadly to include other sources of market power for workers, including job search frictions
and potentially even social norms. Finally, while we call factor one labor and factor two
2capital, we can just as easily think of factor one as unionized unskilled labor and factor two
as nonunion skilled labor.
Whether to integrate or outsource–the “make or buy” decision–is a classic topic in the
theory of the ﬁrm. Much of the literature has focused on the role of incomplete contracts
(Williamson (1979), Grossman and Hart (1986)).1 In these models, economic agents cannot
contractually commit to future behavior. Firm boundaries are drawn to optimally inﬂuence
incentives, given the constraints of incomplete contracts. This kind of timing and commit-
ment issue arises in our model. We make a crucial assumption that ﬁrms make long-run
decisions about integration status before they engage in wage negotiations; the anticipation
of lower wages on the labor-intensive task is precisely what induces ﬁrms to outsource. While
our paper follows this literature in that timing and commitment play a key role, the model
we consider is very diﬀerent from those in the existing literature. This is especially true in
the way we highlight and incorporate diﬀerences in factor composition across tasks Also, the
main question we address, How does outsourcing impact wages in general equilibrium? is
diﬀerent from the standard topic in the incomplete contracts literature, which is: When and
how does outsourcing occur?
In its general equilibrium approach and its focus on what happens when trade frictions
d e c l i n e ,t h ep a p e ri sc l o s ei ns p i r i tt ot h et r a d el i t e r a t u r eo no ﬀshoring (e.g., Grossman and
Helpman (2005), Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)) and assignment theories
of foreign direct investment (FDI) about who should specialize in which task (Nocke and
Yeaple (2008)).2 Our paper is particularly related to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
That paper highlights how a reduction in an outsourcing friction can potentially raise low-
skill wages in a high-skill country through what they call a productivity eﬀect.T h i s e ﬀect
operates through a ﬁxed amount of outsourcing proceeding more eﬃciently on account of
the technical change. This channel operates in our model as well. Fixing t h ee x t e n to f
outsourcing at some positive level, a reduction in the outsourcing friction raises wages as
workers share the beneﬁt of technological improvements. The negative impact on wages
from technical change in our model comes entirely from its impact on increasing the extent
of outsourcing.
The tensions that exist in our model are related to issues that arise in the analysis of price
discrimination. With integration, there is a uniform wage for labor. With outsourcing, there
1A more recent literature examines how information ﬂows aﬀect integration decisions (Alonso, Dessein,
and Matouschek (2008), Friebel and Raith (2006)).
2See also Liao (2009) for the analogous impact in an urban economics model.
3is one wage for workers who do the labor-intensive task and a second, higher wage for workers
who do the capital-intensive task. The uniform wage under outsourcing lies between the two
task-speciﬁc, discriminatory wages. In the standard decision-theoretic analysis of monopoly
price discrimination, a monopolist is always better oﬀ when price discrimination is feasible.
However, as shown in Holmes (1989) and Corts (1998), the ability to price discriminate
in a competitive context can potentially reduce equilibrium returns to price discriminators.
In an analogous way, unions in our model are worse oﬀ in equilibrium when workers doing
diﬀerent tasks receive diﬀerent wages because of outsourcing. As noted parenthetically above,
wage levels and total wage payments to workers doing the capital-intensive task actually do
increase with outsourcing compared to integration. But we show that these gains are more
than oﬀset by losses suﬀered by workers doing the labor-intensive task.
Existing empirical research provides evidence that wage reductions play a role in motivat-
ing outsourcing decisions. The building service industry (i.e., janitorial services) is obviously
a labor-intensive industry. Abraham (1990) and Dube and Kaplan (2008) show that build-
ing service employees employed in the business service sector (e.g., contract cleaning ﬁrms)
receive substantially lower wages and beneﬁts than employees doing the same jobs and with
similar characteristics employed by manufacturing ﬁrms. And Abraham and Taylor (1996)
show that it is the higher-wage ﬁrms that are more likely to contract out cleaning services.
Forbes and Lederman (forthcoming) discuss how airlines spin oﬀ short routes to regional
airlines because the pilots of these airlines are then less able to extract rents. This ﬁts our
model if short routes with small planes are less capital intensive than long-haul routes with
large planes. Doellgast and Greer (2007) provide a case study of the German automobile
industry to show how outsourcing parts has cut rents. We do not know of such a study
for the U.S. automobile industry, but as mentioned in the ﬁr s tp a r a g r a p h ,t h e r ei sa n e c d o -
tal evidence that the same has happened in the United States. More speciﬁcally, General
Motors (GM) spun oﬀ Delphi, its labor-intensive parts operations, and subsequently Delphi
is trying to cut wages “to as little as $10 an hour from as much as $30.”3 GM spun oﬀ
the parts operation American Axle in 1992, and subsequently American Axle succeeded in
cutting wages by about a third.4 As part of the plan to outsource janitorial services at GM
assembly plants, the expectation is that wages to janitors would fall from $28 an hour for an
in-house GM employee to around $12 an hour for an employee of a contract cleaning ﬁrm.5
3The quote is from the New York Times, November 19, 2005, “For a G.M. Family, the American Dream
Vanishes,” by Danny Hakim.
4See “American Axle Contract Ratiﬁed, Strike Ends,” Reuters, May 22, 2008.
5See “GM to UAW: Let’s Cut Costs,” Workforce Management: News in Brief, April 16, 2007.
4The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model, and
Section 3 works out what happens when wages are ﬁxed. Section 4 is the main analysis
determining the link between outsourcing and wages. Section 5 concludes.
2M o d e l
We describe the technology and then explain how unions operate. Next we explain timing
in the model and deﬁne equilibrium.
2.1 The Technology
We model an industry in which a ﬁnal good is made out of two intermediates. The ﬁrst
is labor-intensive (intermediate 1). The other is capital-intensive (intermediate 2). Let 
denote a quantity of intermediate .
A ﬁrm may be vertically integrated, producing both intermediates and combining them
on its premises. Or it can be specialized in the production of a particular intermediate good.
The ﬁnal good results from combining the two intermediates according to a ﬁxed-proportions
technology. If the two inputs 1 and 2 are produced in a vertically integrated ﬁrm, then
ﬁnal good output equals
 = (1 2)=m i n{1 2}.( 1 )
If the inputs are produced by two specialists, then ﬁnal good output is
 = (1 2)=( 1− )min{1 2}.
The parameter  ≥ 0 is the outsourcing friction that must be incurred when the two steps
of production are undertaken by two diﬀerent ﬁrms.
To illustrate the friction , suppose that if the two steps are undertaken by separate
ﬁrms, the intermediates need to be wrapped in certain protective packaging before being
shipped oﬀ to ﬁnal assembly. An integrated plant making both intermediates and combining
them on premises can avoid the packaging process. In this illustrative case,  represents
t h ep h y s i c a lc o s to fw r a p p i n ga n du n w r a p p i n gt h ei n t e r m e d i a t e sa sw e l la st h ec o s to ft h e
packing materials. In addition to physical costs like these, as discussed in the introduction
we interpret  broadly as representing costs of coordinating production. Recent advances in
5information and transportation technology have substantially lowered such costs; i.e.,  has
decreased.
The three factors of production in the economy are: managers, labor, and capital. There
is a unit measure of managers who each own one ﬁrm. Given the one-to-one relationship,
for simplicity, will refer to the combination of one manager and one ﬁrm as a “ﬁrm.” There
is a measure ¯  of labor that is supplied inelastically to the economy. There is a perfectly
elastic supply of capital to the economy at a rental price of  per unit.
Each ﬁrm has access to the same technology for converting capital and labor into in-
termediates. Let (1 1 2 2) denote an input vector for a particular ﬁrm, where  and 
denote the amount of capital and labor the ﬁrm allocates to the production of intermediate
. Given such an input vector, the production levels for each intermediate equal
1 = 1 (1 + 2)
−(1−) (2)
2 = 2 (1 + 2)
−(1−) 
where  is the composite input for intermediate i deﬁned by









 .( 3 )
To understand this technology, observe that the  and  are ﬁrst combined in a constant-
returns Cobb-Douglas fashion through (3) to create a composite input .T h e n 1 and 2
are run through (2) to determine the intermediate production levels 1 and 2.T h i s l a s t
step allows for diminishing marginal product where the level of curvature is governed by the
parameter .I f =1 ,t h e n = , and we have constant returns to scale in the relationship
between capital and labor and the intermediate outputs. We assume  ∈ (01),w h i c h
implies diminishing returns. Note the degree of diminishing returns in (3) is determined
by the total composite input 1 + 2. An increase in production of one intermediate lowers
the marginal product of the other intermediate. Finally, we emphasize that in addition to
the explicit vector of inputs (1 1 2 2) in the technology above, there is also implicitly an
input requirement of a unit manager.
The parameter  ∈ [01] is the labor share coeﬃcient for intermediate . In keeping with










To simplify calculations, we assume symmetry,
1 =1− 2.
For some of the analysis, it is convenient to focus on the limiting case where 1 =1and
2 =0 , so intermediate 1 uses only labor and intermediate 2 uses only capital. In the limiting
case, the Cobb-Douglas composite inputs (3) reduce to
1 = 1 (4)
2 = 2.
A ﬁrm can choose one of three types of vertical structure. The ﬁrst possibility is an
intermediate 1 specialist. In this case, the ﬁrm sets 1  0 and 2 =0 , and the production





(Again, in addition to the composite input 1, there is implicitly an input requirement
here of a unit manager.6) The second possibility is the analogous case of an intermediate
2 specialist. The third possibility is a fully vertically integrated plant. Given the ﬁxed-
proportions technology for ﬁnal goods, an integrated plant sets 1 = 2 =  and the
output of each intermediate –and ﬁnal good output  –equals





6We could be explicit about the management input by including it in the production function with a
share coeﬃcient of 1 − .
7By design, the vertical structure is indeterminate when factor markets are perfectly com-
petitive and the outsourcing friction  is zero. To illustrate, consider the limiting case where
1 =1 , 2 =0 , and keep things simple by supposing the wage and the rental rate are identi-
cal and equal to one,  =  =1 . Then given (4), the per unit costs of making the composite
inputs 1 and 2 both equal one. The symmetry between labor and capital, together with
 =0 , implies that the competitive equilibrium price of each intermediate is half the price of
the ﬁnal good, 1 = 2 = 1
2. Using (5), a specialist producer of intermediate 1 operating










Using (6), a vertically integrated plant doing both intermediates at half this level,  = 1
21,

























Since this is the same as the proﬁt 1 to being an intermediate 1 specialist, ﬁrms are in-
diﬀerent to the choice of vertical structure. Once we add a positive outsourcing friction
0, obviously ﬁrms will strictly prefer to be vertically integrated. But again, we have
presumed competitive factor markets. We will see that when we add monopoly power to the
labor market, an incentive for outsourcing emerges that can potentially overcome a positive
friction .
2.2 Unions
Each ﬁrm has a union that acts as a monopolist over the supply of labor to the ﬁrm. The
union at a particular ﬁrm buys labor on the open market at a competitive wage ◦ and
resells it to the ﬁrm at wage , pocketing the diﬀerence  − ◦.T h eﬁrm then makes its
input choices, taking  as given. This setup–where the union picks the wage and the ﬁrm
8picks the employment level–is called the “right-to-manage” model in the labor literature.
The union operates at the plant level rather than the economy level. So the union at ﬁrm 
sets a wage that is speciﬁct oﬁrm .
We assume that the existence of monopoly rents attracts resources, following a long
tradition in the economics literature. (See Posner (1975) for an early treatment and Cole
and Ohanian (2004) for a recent treatment.) That is, resources get dissipated through rent
seeking behavior. Speciﬁcally, of the ¯  units of labor that are inelastically supplied to the
economy, a portion  goes toward rent seeking and the remaining portion ◦ goes to the
competitive spot market to work in production,
¯  = 
 + 
◦.
We assume there is some matching process between the unit measure of ﬁrms and measure
 of rent seekers that operates in a fashion such that the union rents in the economy
are divided equally (in expectation) across rent seekers. As an example matching process,
suppose for simplicity there are a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms and a ﬁnite number of rent seekers.
Begin by taking one ﬁrm and randomly draw a rent seeker from the pool of  rent seekers
to which to assign the monopoly. Next, take a second ﬁrm and again randomly assign it to a
draw from the original pool of  rent seekers. That is, use a “sampling with replacement”
process. With this process, any one rent seeker might end up with zero, one, or two or more
monopolies. Given our assumption of risk neutrality, the particulars of the distribution
across rent seekers will not matter, only the mean number of monopolies per rent seeker.
In summary, the abstraction employed here captures two main elements. First, there is
market power in the provision of the labor factor, but no analogous market power in the
provision of capital. In the formal setup, the rents go to the union and the production workers
receive the competitive wage. However, it is straightforward to reinterpret the structure so
t h a tt h ep e o p l ed o i n gt h ep r o d u c t i o nw o r ka re also engaging in rent seeking, so that the
actual wage received includes the competitive wage as well as a rent component. Second,
rent seeking consumes labor resources. This can be best understood as workers engaging in
search behavior to obtain union jobs. Finally, while we treat the rent-seeking assumption as
our baseline case, we also determine what happens without the rent-seeking assumption.
92.3 Timing and Equilibrium
Timing is in three stages. In stage 1, each ﬁrm commits to its vertical structure choice:
intermediate 1 specialist, intermediate 2 specialist, or fully integrated. Let  be the share
of ﬁrms choosing vertical structure  (with  =1or  =2for specialists and  =  for a
vertically integrated producer). Also in stage 1, a measure  of workers choose to seek the
position of labor monopolist available at each ﬁrm. In stage 2, the labor monopolist at each
particular ﬁrm  sets the wage  for ﬁrm . In stage 3, inputs are procured and production
takes place.
An equilibrium is a list
¡
1 2   1 2  ◦ 1 2 
¢
that satisﬁes six con-
ditions. First, each ﬁrm’s choice of vertical structure  ∈ {12} must be optimal, taking
as given how its choice  impacts its wage  and taking as given the output prices. Second,
the return to directing a unit of labor to the competitive spot market must equal the return





where the right-hand-side term averages the aggregate union rent  over the  labor units
that seek it. Third, the choice of wage oﬀered by the union of a type  ﬁrm must maximize
the union’s proﬁt, given the anticipated demand behavior of the ﬁrm. Fourth, each ﬁrm of
type  chooses inputs to maximize proﬁts. Fifth, there must be market clearing in the spot
market for labor. Sixth, the intermediate prices 1 and 2 faced by specialist producers must
satisfy the arbitrage condition,
1 + 2 =( 1− ) (8)
since combining one unit of each of the specialist produced goods yields 1 −  units of ﬁnal
good.7
3 Results for a Fixed Open-Market Wage
We split the analysis of the model into two sections. In this section, we derive an initial
set of results on the workings of the model for a ﬁxed open-market wage ◦.I n t h e n e x t
section, we take the open-market wage as endogenous and determine how it is impacted by
7S i n c ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h es u p p l yo fc a p i t a li sp e r f e c t l ye l a s t i ca t, and since the rental rate is the
numeraire,  =1 ,t h eﬁnal good price  in terms of the rental rate is an exogenous parameter.
10outsourcing.
3 . 1 H o wU n i o nW a g e sa n dP r o d u c t i o nC o s t sV a r yw i t hV e r t i c a l
Structure
It turns out that it is possible to derive optimal union wages without taking into account
equilibrium conditions in the output markets. This subsection derives the optimal union
wages and determines how production costs depend upon vertical structure.
We begin with an analysis of an intermediate 1 specialist. Suppose we are at stage 3 and
an intermediate 1 specialist faces a wage of 1. To study the ﬁrm’s choice problem, it is
useful to ﬁrst determine the cost function of constructing 1 units of the composite input.
Given the constant returns Cobb-Douglas production function (3), it is a standard result
that the cost function equals
1(1 1)=
1
1 1.( 9 )
(Since we are setting the rental rate on capital as the numeraire,  =1 ,t h et e r m1− that
would normally appear drops out.) Furthermore, the cost-minimizing labor input choice is
1(1 1)=1
−(1−1)
1 1.( 1 0 )
From (5), a specialist producer with composite input level 1 produces 

1 units of inter-





1 1.( 1 1 )
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1 − (1 − 1)
1 − 
.( 1 4 )
Ak e yp o i n ti st h a te l a s t i c i t yd e p e n d so nt h el a b o rs h a r ec o e ﬃcient 1. The higher 1,t h e
more elastic the labor demand.
With ﬁrm behavior at stage 3 pinned down, we go backward and examine the problem
of the labor monopolist in stage 2 picking 1. The labor monopolist obtains labor at the





Note that the monopoly operates at the ﬁrm level, not the economy level. If the monopoly
were at the economy level, it would take into account the general equilibrium impact of the
posted wage. By operating at the ﬁrm level, the labor monopolist takes output prices and the
open-market wage ◦ as ﬁxed. Since labor demand is constant elasticity, the rent-maximizing








1 − (1 − 1)
1

◦.( 1 6 )
The analysis for an intermediate 2 specialist is the same as above with a change in
subscripts. Since 2  1, labor demand for an intermediate 2 ﬁrm is less elastic than for
an intermediate 1 ﬁrm, 2  1, and the wage is greater, 2  1.
We turn next to the case of a vertically integrated ﬁrm. Given the ﬁxed coeﬃcient tech-
nology for the ﬁnal good, an integrated ﬁrm produces an equal amount of both intermediate
inputs. Let  be the composite input level of each intermediate. Given ,t h ec o s to f





2).( 1 7 )







2).( 1 8 )




Maximizing (18) with respect to the choice of  and then plugging  into (19) yields the






















Let  solve this problem. In general, no analytic solution exists. However, we can obtain
an expression for the limiting case where 1 goes to 1 and 2 goes to zero,
lim
1→1 =
1 −  + ◦

.








This follows because the elasticity for a specialist producing intermediate 1 goes to 1
1− while
it goes to 1 for intermediate 2.
A key result that plays an important role in the subsequent analysis is that the total
cost of constructing a composite input for each intermediate is less under specialization than
under vertical integration. Let   and  be the cost of producing one unit of composite
input  in the vertically integrated and specialist cases. Note that if 1 = 2 = 1
2,t h et w o
intermediates are the same in elasticity, and there is no diﬀerence between the specialization
structure and vertical integration in terms of union wage setting behavior; i.e.,   = .
But when 1  1
2,t h e r ei sad i ﬀerence. We begin with an analytic result at the limit where
1 goes to one. Let  = 1  +2  be the combined cost to the vertically integrated ﬁrm
of one unit of each composite input.
13Lemma 1.
lim
1→1[1 + 2]  lim
1→1












which immediately implies the result. ¥
One thing to note about the limit for an intermediate 2 specialist is that even though
t h ew a g ei sg o i n gt oi n ﬁnity, the spending share on labor is going to zero. In the limit, the
intermediate 2 specialist needs only to worry about expenditures on capital. At the limit,
it requires one unit of capital to make one composite input. Since  =1 , it follows that
lim1→1 2 =1 .
Understanding the limit where intermediate 1 is pure labor and intermediate 2 pure cap-
ital is easy. The demand for labor by a vertically integrated ﬁrm, for which labor represents
only part of the factor bill, is obviously less elastic than for an intermediate 1 specialist, for
which labor is the only input. So the union sets a higher wage to an integrated plant. By
outsourcing the labor task, there is a clear savings in the wage bill, while the task using
capital pays the market rate for capital either way.
Things are more subtle in the general case, 1  1, 2  0, where both intermediates
use both factors. Here, there is a trade-oﬀ. By splitting up production, an intermediate
1 specialist pays a lower wage compared to an integrated plant. But an intermediate 2
specialist pays a higher wage. Intuitively, since the former uses labor intensively while the
latter does not, the cost savings on the former should outweigh the cost increases on the
latter. We can show with numerical methods that this is true.8 By scanning over a ﬁne grid
of 1 ∈ (1
21),  ∈ (01),a n d◦ (and 2 =1− 1), we ﬁnd that
[1 + 2]  .( 2 2 )
8We verify this claim over a ﬁne grid across the ranges 1 ∈ [5199],  ∈ [0399],a n d◦ ∈ [01500]
We stay away from extreme values to avoid numerical inaccuracies.
143.2 Choice of Vertical Structure
In this subsection we examine a ﬁrm’s choice of vertical structure. For a ﬁxed open-market
wage ◦, we determine how the vertical structure choice depends on the outsourcing friction
.
Proposition 1. For any open-market wage ◦, there exists a unique ˆ (◦)  0,s u c ht h a t
if ˆ (◦),a l lﬁrms are specialized while if ˆ (◦),a l lﬁrms are vertically integrated.
Proof. Given an output price  and a unit composite input cost  of an intermediate 















1− .( 2 3 )


















If there is an equilibrium with specialization, both intermediate goods must be produced,
and so ﬁr m sm u s tb ei n d i ﬀerent between producing both, i.e., 1 = 2. By arbitrage, we






− (1 − ).( 2 5 )
Plugging this into (23) and using straightforward algebra, a ﬁrm prefers specialization to












− .( 2 6 )
Recall from the previous section that 1 + 2  . Lemma A1 in the appendix shows
that when 1 + 2   holds, (26) holds at  =0 .D e ﬁne ˆ  to be the unique  where
(26) holds with equality. ¥
That outsourcing does not take place when  is large is obvious. What is interesting about
Proposition 1 is that outsourcing necessarily does take place when the friction  is small but
still positive. Recall that, in this environment, vertical structure would be indeterminate
15if both factor markets were competitive and if the friction  were zero. If factor markets
were competitive and there were any positive friction, integration would necessarily prevail,
a st h e r ei sn ot e c h n o l o g i c a lb e n e ﬁt from specialization. But with monopoly in the labor
market, there is an incentive to vertically disintegrate to limit rent extraction by the unions.
So specialization prevails if the outsourcing friction is small enough.
The shape of the relationship between the cutoﬀ ˆ  and the open-market wage ◦ plays
a role in the subsequent analysis. We call this the “ˆ  c u r v e ”a n dw ep l o ti ti nF i g u r e1
for several diﬀerent values of 1, 1 ∈ {06081}, ﬁxing  =0 5.9 We put the wage ◦
on the vertical axis and ˆ  on the horizontal, because this will be convenient later when 
is exogenous and ◦ is endogenous. As illustrated, for a given value of 1, there exists a
◦
min such that ˆ (◦) strictly decreases in ◦ for ◦  ◦
min, and strictly increases in ◦
for ◦  ◦
min. We can prove analytically that this property holds at 1 =1 ,a n dw ev e r i f y
numerically that the property holds for general 1.10 Note that in the opposite limiting case
of 1 = 2 = 1
2, vertical structure has no impact on wages, since both intermediates have
the same labor intensity. In this extreme case, ˆ (◦)=0for all ◦. So the case of high 1
is the interesting case.
4 Outsourcing and Wage Decline
We now solve for equilibrium in the labor market and determine how both the open-market
wage ◦ and the level of union rents vary with the outsourcing friction .
It is convenient to split up the analysis. First, we impose an artiﬁcial restriction that
vertical integration is infeasible so all ﬁrms must be specialists and determine what the
equilibrium would look like in this case. Next, we ﬂip the restriction so only integration is
feasible. In the end, we allow both to be feasible and determine what happens.
4.1 Only Specialization
This subsection determines equilibrium when integration is not an option. We solve for how
the demand for labor depends upon a given ◦ and then solve for market clearing.
Given ◦ and the associated union markups over ◦ (see (15)), let ˜ 1(◦) and ˜ 2(◦)
9We ﬁx  = 5 to construct all the ﬁgures. Also, the wage on the vertical axis is in log scale.
10T h ea n a l y t i cp r o o ff o rt h e1 =1case is available in separate notes. Our numerical result for 1  1
u s e st h es a m eg r i da si nf o o t n o t e8 .
16b et h ep r i c e st h a te q u a t et h ep r o ﬁto fa ni n t e r m e d i a t e1s p e c i a l i s tw i t ha ni n t e r m e d i a t e2
specialist (see (25)) and that solve the arbitrage condition 1+2 =( 1− ).L e t˜ (◦) be
the derived demand for labor for specialist  taking into account the impact of ◦ on price.








Analogously, let ˜ (◦) be the derived supply of intermediate  by a specialist .L e t˜ (◦) be







since the left and right sides are the total productions of intermediates 1 and 2 and these






Putting all of this together, the total demand in the economy for production labor at an










where the subscript  signiﬁes we are in the Only Specialization case.
We turn now to the labor allocated to rent seeking. When the open-market wage is ◦,










Plugging this into the equilibrium condition (7) that equalizes the return to rent seeking and


















◦),( 2 7 )
17where we note the explicit dependence of demand on the outsourcing friction, as this is useful
at this point. Market clearing requires that demand ˜ 
 (◦) equal the exogenous supply
¯ . We obtain the following result for the limiting case.
Lemma 2. Assume the limiting case of 1 =1and 2 =0 . (i) Overall demand ˜ 
 (◦)
strictly decreases in ◦ and . (ii) For a given ,t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u e◦∗
 () that clears the
open market, ˜ 
 (◦∗
 ()) ≡ ¯  and ◦∗
 () is strictly decreasing in . (iii) A single-crossing
property holds between the ◦∗
 curve and the ˆ  curve deﬁned earlier. Formally, for any 0
where 0  ˆ (◦∗
 (0)),t h e nˆ (◦∗
 ()) for all  0.
Proof. See appendix.¥
We use numerical methods to verify that the three properties listed hold for general 1.11
The relationship ◦∗
 () is what the equilibrium open-market wage would be if special-
ization were the only feasible vertical structure. We call this the “◦∗
 curve” and illustrate
it in Figure 2 for two cases: one where labor supply ¯  is small, so ◦∗
 is high, and the other
where ¯  is large, so ◦∗
 is low. The ﬁgure illustrates that ◦∗
 strictly decreases in  (part
(ii) of the lemma). Moreover, it crosses the ˆ  curve only once (part (iii)). Let 
+
 be deﬁned
as the  where the intersection occurs,







).( 2 8 )
4.2 Only Integration
Now consider the case where only vertical integration is feasible. Analogous to (27) above, we
can construct labor demand ˜ 
(◦) and equate this to supply ¯  to obtain the equilibrium
open-market wage ◦∗
(). We can show the analog of Lemma 2 holds for this case, with one
diﬀerence.12 In the integration case, the outsourcing friction  is irrelevant, so ◦∗
() and
˜ 
(◦) are constant as functions of . (This makes the single crossing property trivial
in the integration case.) Figure 3 illustrates two example ◦∗
 curves: one with ¯  small and
the other with ¯  large. Analogous to (28), deﬁne 
+
 to be the point where ◦∗
 intersects
ˆ .
11We verify (i) holds over a grid across the ranges 1 ∈ [559],  =[ 19],  ∈ [510], ◦ ∈ [2100] and
 ∈ [095]. For (ii) and (iii), we consider ¯  ∈ [15] and narrow the range of  to  ∈ [06] to maintain
numerical accuracy.





. Parts (ii) and (iii) are analytically straightforward. We verify part (i) (that ˜ 
(◦) is
strictly decreasing in ◦) numerically using the same grid as in footnote 11.
184.3 A Key Step
The key step underlying our main result is what happens to labor demand at the ˆ  boundary
of indiﬀerence between specialization and integration. Our result is
Lemma 3. Take a point (0 ◦0) on the ˆ  curve so that 0 =ˆ (◦0). Assume the limiting
case, 1 =1 , 2 =0 .T h e n ˜ 
 (◦00)  ˜ 
(◦00). T h a ti s ,l a b o rd e m a n di nt h e
only-specialization case is less than in the only-integration case.
Proof. See appendix.¥
As before, we use numerical analysis to verify that this result holds for general 1.13
To shed some light on the mechanics of the result, we note that if we only look at the
demand for production labor, there is an ambiguous relationship between the two cases, i.e.,
˜ ◦
(◦00) could be bigger or smaller than ˜ ◦
(◦00). But for rent-seeking labor, there
is an unambiguous comparison. Rents are strictly lower in the  case compared to ,s o
fewer workers are attracted to rent seeking in the  case. This eﬀect is large enough to more
than oﬀset any countervailing eﬀect on the demand for production labor.
4.4 Putting It All Together
We now put this all together and completely characterize how the equilibrium in the economy
depends upon the degree of outsourcing.
We start by deﬁning a critical level for the exogenous labor supply,





where as deﬁned earlier ◦
min minimizes ˆ (◦) and ˆ min =ˆ (◦
min).W h e n¯ ¯ min,t h e◦∗

curve intersects ˆ  on the upward-sloping portion of ˆ  (as in the small ¯  case in Figure 2).
When ¯ ¯ min, ◦∗
 intersects ˆ  on the downward-sloping portion (as in the large ¯  case).
We next provide our formal characterization. On a ﬁrst reading, it might be helpful to
skip the formal statement and jump to the discussion below about the graphical illustration
of the result.
Proposition 2. Assume the limiting case 1 =1 , 2 =0 .
Case 1: Suppose ¯  ≤ ¯ min.D e ﬁne = 
+
 and ¯  = 
+
.T h e n  ¯ .T h e r e i s a u n i q u e
equilibrium that depends upon  in the following way:
13We use the same grid as in footnote 11.












Subcase 1(iii) For  ∈ (¯ ),t h e r ei spartial integration, 0    1.T h e w a g e i s












and  strictly increases in . Also, the equilibrium wage ◦∗() strictly increases in ,s o
more outsourcing co-moves with lower wages.




is on the downward-sloping portion
of the ˆ  curve as illustrated in the large-¯  case in Figure 4), then deﬁne  ≡ 
+





min,t h e nd e ﬁne  ≡ ˆ min and ¯  ≡ 
+







, there is a unique equilibrium that follows the pattern
of Subcases 1(i) and 1(ii) above. If ¯ 
+
 and  ∈ (¯ 
+
), there is a unique equilibrium
with partial integration following Subcase 1(iii) above.
For  ∈ (¯ ), a nonempty open interval, there are three equilibria labeled  and
. Equilibrium  has full specialization, 
 =0 . Equilibria  has partial integration,

 ∈ (01). Equilibrium  has partial or full integration, 
 ∈ (01],a n d
  
.A c r o s s
the three equilibria, there is a strict ordering that less integration is associated with a lower
open-market wage, ◦  ◦  ◦.
Proof. See appendix.¥
The result is best understood with a graph. Figure 4 combines Figure 2 (keeping the ◦∗

to the left of ˆ  because specialization is preferred there) with Figure 3 (keeping ◦∗
 to the
right of ˆ  because integration is preferred there). Consider ﬁrst the small-¯  case on the top
portion of Figure 4. The set of (◦) pairs that are equilibria are highlighted by the solid
dark line. Notice point  where the ◦∗
 curve intersects the ˆ  curve. There is an equilibrium
20here where all ﬁrms are specialized because (1) being on the ˆ  curve means ﬁrms are just as
happy to be specialized as integrated and (2) being on the ◦∗
 curve means supply equals
demand in the labor market. For  to the left of point , complete specialization is the only
possibility, and we follow along the ◦∗
 curve to pin down the wage. Notice that as  is
decreased in this range, wages rise. This is an example of the productivity eﬀect highlighted
in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Over this region, all activity is outsourced, and
the impact of reducing the friction  is that this given level of outsourcing takes place more
eﬃciently. Some of the gain is passed along in terms of higher wages.
Next, notice point  where ◦∗
 intersects the ˆ  curve. Observe point  is at a higher
wage than . This necessarily follows from Lemma 3. At point ,i fﬁrms were to switch
over to vertical integration from specialization (which they are indiﬀerent to doing), total
labor demand would increase. To get market clearing, the wage needs to increase, and that
is what happens at point B. For  in between points  and , the wage is set on the ˆ  curve
to make ﬁrms indiﬀerent to vertical structure. A fraction  are integrated, and this share
is chosen to clear the labor market. The key thing to note is that as we move from  to 
and lower the outsourcing friction, the extent of outsourcing increases at the same time that
t h ew a g ef a l l s .T h i si st h em a i nr e s u l to ft h ep a p e r .
Next, consider the large ¯  case illustrated at the bottom of Figure 4 where the action
is on the downward-sloping portion of the ˆ  curve. Again, the equilibria are highlighted by
a solid dark line. Consider what happens for  between points  and .F o r a n y s u c h ,
we see there are three equilibria: (1) a pure specialization equilibrium ( =0 )o nt h e◦∗

curve with a low wage, (2) a pure integration equilibrium ( =1 )o nt h e◦∗
 curve with a
high wage, and (3) a partial integration equilibrium with an intermediate wage. Again, an
increase in outsourcing goes together with a decline in wages. But this time we are moving
across equilibria with no change in economic fundamentals (i.e.,  is ﬁxed).
We have been focusing on the open-market wage, but we now turn to the average wage
paid by ﬁrms. This is the wage bill added up across all ﬁrms divided by the number of
production workers. It equals

 =
111 + 222 + 







which is the open-market wage plus the average union markup. Above we show that the
21open-market wage declines with outsourcing. Our next result shows that the mean ﬁrm wage
also declines with outsourcing.
Proposition 3. Suppose 1 =1 , 2 =0 .
(i) Assume Case 1 where  ≤ ¯ min so there is a unique equilibrium. In the region of
partial integration,  ∈ (¯ ),t h em e a nﬁrm wage is lower the lower is .
(ii) Assume Case 2 where ¯ min so there is a range of  ∈ (¯ ) with multiple
equilibria. Across the multiple equilibria, less integration is associated with a lower mean
ﬁrm wage.
Sketch of Proof. Calculations in the appendix show that ◦ decreases with outsourcing.
Since ◦ goes down, both eﬀects work together to lower the mean ﬁrm wage.¥
4.5 The Role of Rent Seeking
The above analysis assumes that rent seeking absorbs part of the labor supply according
to the equilibrium condition (7). In this subsection, we consider an alternative formulation
where the rents are distributed across workers, without absorbing labor resources.
It is straightforward to modify the equilibrium conditions for this alternative formula-
tion. In particular, we need to change the deﬁnition of labor demand (27) to only include
production labor ˜ ◦
(◦) (and not any rent-seeking labor). Analogous to the above, deﬁne
¯ 
min as the exogenous labor supply at which the ◦∗
 curve intersects the minimum
point on the ˆ  curve,
¯ 






i.e., at ¯ 
min and ˆ min, the labor market clears at ◦
min with only specialization. Our
result is
Proposition 4. Consider the limiting case 1 =1 , 2 =0in the alternative model where
rent seeking does not absorb resources. There is a unique equilibrium for all parameters.
Deﬁne ≡ 
+
 and ¯  ≡ 
+
.F o r¯  6= ¯ 
min ,  ¯ . There are two cases:
(i) For Case 1, ¯  ≤ ¯ 
min , the characterization is the same as Case 1 of Proposition
2. In particular, for  over the range (¯ ), the vertically integrated share ∗
(),t h e
open-market wage ◦∗(),a n dt h em e a nﬁrm wage () all strictly increase in .
(ii) For Case 2, ¯ ¯ 
min ,f o r and ¯ , the characterization is the same as
in Case 1. For  ∈ (¯ ), the integrated share ∗
() increases in , but the open-market
wage ◦∗() actually decreases with .T h e m e a n - ﬁrm wage ∗() increases in  over
22this range.
Proof. The appendix sketches the proof. We emphasize that the ﬁnal claim that ∗()
increases in  in Case 2 and  ∈ (¯ ) is based on numerical analysis. The calculation
involves a nonlinear equation that is diﬃcult to characterize analytically.¥
When ¯  is low so that the ◦∗
 intersects ˆ  on the upward-sloping portion, the analysis
in the alternative model is identical to the baseline. But things are diﬀerent when the
intersection occurs on the downward-sloping portion, as illustrated in Figure 5. Here, the
result in Lemma 3 ﬂips sign, so that the ◦∗
 curve actually cuts the ˆ  curve below where
it intersects ◦∗
 , as illustrated. Readily apparent from the ﬁgure is that the equilibrium
is unique for each ; the region of multiplicity in Figure 4 is gone. Note the equilibrium
open-market wage ◦∗ actually decreases in  from point  to point ,s oi nt h i sw a yt h e
analysis is diﬀerent from the baseline. But the mean wage  paid by ﬁr m si st h er e l e v a n t
wage measure to be looking at. This increases with  from point  to point , analogous
to Proposition 3. So our main result from the baseline model that increases in outsourcing
go together with declines in wages is preserved in the alternative model.
It is interesting that there are no multiple equilibria in the alternative model. To get
as e n s eo fw h a ti sd i ﬀerent here, observe ﬁrst that the emergence of outsourcing depresses
labor rents. In the baseline model, the reduction in rents attracts less labor to outsourcing,
leaving more labor for production and further depressing wages. It is possible for these lower
wages to spur additional outsourcing, creating a positive feedback loop and reinforcing the
original outsourcing at the start of the story. When the rent-seeking element is taken out, a
piece of the loop is gone, and the equilibrium is now unique.
4.6 General Input Shares
Our formal results assume the limiting case 1 =1 , 2 =0 . We illustrate what happens for
general 1  1, 2 =1 −1 with numerical analysis of Case 1 (the small-¯  case with a unique
equilibrium). Fixing all of the parameters other than , we determine 
+
 (the lowest  with
complete vertical integration at point B in Figure 4) and 
+
 (the highest  with complete




 and determine how
equilibrium variables change as the economy moves from complete integration to complete
specialization. We report the results in Table 1 for both the baseline case with rent seeking
23and the non-rent-seeking case.14
Panel A reports the limiting case of 1 =1that is covered in Propositions 3 and 4.





, and we can see this in the table. Note that wages are signiﬁcantly higher in the rent-
seeking case because rent seeking absorbs labor driving up wages. We also report the total
wage bill, total ﬁrm proﬁts, and total surplus (the sum of ﬁrm proﬁts plus the wage bill).
In terms of eﬀects on total surplus, there are three considerations. First, the switch from
integration to outsourcing weakens the labor monopoly, which reduces wasteful rent-seeking
behavior. Second, ﬁrms’ decisions are less distorted. Oﬀsetting these positive impacts is a
third consideration that outsourcing entails a friction (approximately 13 percent of output
in Panel A) that is avoided with integration. In the rent-seeking case, the net eﬀect of
outsourcing on surplus is strictly positive.15 With no rent seeking, the ﬁrst consideration is
eliminated, and the net eﬀect on total surplus is negative; the cost of the friction outweighs
the beneﬁts of reduced distortions. Despite the friction, ﬁrms outsource because proﬁts are
higher.
The remaining panels in Table 1 report the results for values of 1 below one. The
qualitative results are identical to what we get for the 1 =1case in Panel A. Quantitatively,
as 1 is decreased toward its lower bound of 1
2,t h ee ﬀects become smaller and go to zero.
At this lower bound, there is no diﬀerence in factor intensity between the two intermediates
and the incentive for outsourcing disappears (ˆ  goes to zero). One interesting thing in these
remaining panels is what happens to the wage bill for intermediate 2, the capital-intensive
task. This is positive in the remaining panels, since 2  0.N o t et h a tt h i sw a g eb i l ls t r i c t l y
increases with outsourcing throughout all the cases. So from labor’s perspective, the process
of vertical disintegration has oﬀsetting eﬀects: the wage bill for intermediate 2 goes up, the
wage bill for intermediate 1 goes down. The key ﬁnding of the paper is that the combined
impact is negative.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a new general equilibrium model of outsourcing and have put it to
work analyzing the connection between outsourcing and wages. We believe this structure
14Throughout the table,  = 5 and ¯  = 16 are held ﬁxed. We have rescaled the total wage bill, proﬁts,
and total surplus by multiplying through by 100.
15The net positive impact is negligible for 1 =1but is signiﬁcant in the other cases.
24is potentially useful for examining other issues related to outsourcing. For example, in our
analysis, ﬁrms are identical in the extent to which they face a union monopoly. A natural
extension is to allow ﬁrms to diﬀer in this dimension. We have done some preliminary
analysis of what happens when some ﬁrms are union and others nonunion and can show
that if nonunion ﬁrms ever specialize, they do the labor-intensive task. We could use the
structure to look at how changes in the extent of unionism impact the degree of outsourcing
and also how outsourcing feeds back and impacts the incentive to organize unions. As another
application, we can put this structure in an international context, and study how exposure
to international trade impacts the incentive for domestic outsourcing. We expect interesting
eﬀects to emerge here because wages impact the incentive for domestic outsourcing (Figure
1) and trade impacts wages.
25Appendix
A.1 Background Calculations for Section 3
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We use (29) to substitute in for  in the third line. The term  in the fourth line is a
multiplicative constant independent of .











1− .( 3 3 )
Straightforward manipulations of the FONC of problem (33) yields
0=1 − (1 − )( − 
◦)
(−(1−) + −)









−(1−) +( 1− )−¢
 + (1−) ,
where to simplify notation, we set 1 =  and 2 =1−. In the limiting case of  =1 ,w e
can solve for the optimal union wage  as
lim
→1 =
1 −  + ◦

.
We next look at costs at the limit under specialization. Using 2 =1− ,a n de q u a t i o n
(15) for the optimal union wage, we can solve for the limiting cost of an intermediate 2
specialist as
lim
















where the last line follows from straightforward limit analysis. For an intermediate 1 spe-








Next we prove Lemma A1 used in Proposition 1.
Lemma A1. Suppose for 0, 0 there is a  ≥  + .T h e n
−−







27Proof. We can rescale things so that  +  =1and show the results holds for  =1 .
Equivalently, that
− (1 − )
−






.( 3 4 )
Deﬁne () by
() ≡ 2




 (1 − )
− .
Straightforward manipulation of (34) shows that it holds if ()  0 for  ∈ [0 1
2).N o wi t
is easy to verify that (1
2)=0 .S oi ti ss u ﬃcient to show that 0()  0 for  ∈ [0 1
2).W e
p r o v et h i si ns e p a r a t en o t e s .¥
F i n a l l y ,w ep r o v et h ec l a i m sm a d ei nS e c t i o n3a b o u tt h es h a p eo ft h eˆ  function in the













































and that ˆ (◦) is strictly decreasing or increasing as ◦  ◦
min or ◦  ◦
min.
A.2 Proofs of Results in Section 4
Lemma 2. Assume the limiting case of 1 =1and 2 =0 . (i) Overall demand ˜ 
 (◦)
strictly decreases in ◦ and .( i i ) F o r a g i v e n , there exists a unique ◦∗
 () that clears
the open market, ˜ 
 (◦∗
 ()) ≡ ¯  and ◦∗
 () is strictly decreasing in . (iii) For any 0
where 0  ˆ (◦∗
 (0)),t h e nˆ (◦∗
 ()) for all  0.
Proof.
28We begin by calculating the production labor demand ˜ ◦
(◦). In the limit where









w h e r ew eu s e( 2 5 )a n dw es u b s t i t u t ei n1 and 2 from above. Now in the limit, labor
demand simply equals composite input, 1 = 1. Using formula (12) for the optimal choice








for 1 given above.











































Now given ﬁxed proportions,









1+◦−.( 3 8 )
















1− .( 3 9 )
The union rent is
˜ (








































Thus total demand ˜ 
 (◦) is proportional to production work demand ˜ ◦
(◦).I t i s
immediate that ˜ ◦
 strictly decreases in . Straightforward calculations in separate notes
show ˜ ◦
 strictly decreases in ◦. Claims (i) and (ii) then follow. To prove (iii), suppose we
have a   ,a n dd e ﬁne ◦
 ≡ ◦∗(), ◦
 ≡ ◦∗(),w h e r e◦
  ◦
 from (ii). Suppose
that  =ˆ (◦
), i.e.














.( 4 1 )
We need to show   ˆ (◦
),o r



















). Taking the formula
(39) for ˜ ◦
























Dividing both sides of (42) by (1 − ) and using (43) to substitute in for (1 − )(1 − )
on the left-hand side and (41) to substitute in for (1 − ) on the right-hand side, it follows


































































































◦ +  (◦)
1−¤1−
is strictly decreasing in ◦ which is immediate. This proves (iii). ¥
As background for the proof of the next Lemma, we derive demand and rents for the
only-integration case in the limiting case. Using (32), that  = 1+◦
 ,t h a t =  in the
limiting case, and that ◦






















































This is strictly decreasing in ◦,s o◦∗
() solving ¯  = ˜ 
(◦) is unique. Since
˜ ◦
(◦) does not depend on , it follows that ◦∗
() is independent of .
Lemma 3. Take a point (0 ◦0) on the ˆ  curve so that 0 =ˆ (◦0). Assume the limiting
case, 1 =1 , 2 =0 .T h e n ˜ 
 (◦00)  ˜ 
(◦00). T h a ti s ,l a b o rd e m a n di nt h e
only-specialization case is less than in the only-integration case.
Proof. Using the formulas (37) for 1 and (44) for  (and keeping in mind that ◦
 = 

















On the ˆ  curve, 1 = . Hence, using (23) and (24), and substituting in 1 = ◦,































Recalling that ˜ 
 = 1
 ˜ ◦
,t h a t˜ ◦
 = 11, substituting in for 1 from (38) and using ˜ ◦
 =

























32Using (45) above, ˜ 
  ˜ 


















We use straightforward calculations to show this is true for ◦  0 in separate notes. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Case 1. Since = 
+
 and ¯  = 
+
in the statement of the proposition, Lemma 3 immediately
implies  ¯ . It is immediate that the equilibrium has to be on the ◦∗
 curve for   ,t h e
ˆ  curve for  ∈ (¯ ),a n dt h e◦∗
 curve, as claimed. The only thing left to prove for Case








that strictly increases in .




 = ˜ 
 (ˆ 
−1())  ¯ , analogously, for

+
 =¯ , ˜ 
 (ˆ 
−1())  ¯ . Hence for  ∈ (¯ ), a unique  ∈ (01) solves the
equation (47) as claimed. For a given 0 ∈ (¯ ),l e t0
 be the share solving (47). Consider















00)  ¯ ,
i.e. holding the  share ﬁxed, but increasing  along that ˆ  curve, lowers demand. To
show this, note that with Case 1 we are on the upward-sloping portion of the ˆ  curve
so ˆ 
−1(00)  ˆ 
−1(0).S i n c e ˜ 
 decreases in ◦ and ,a n ds i n c e˜ 
 decreases in ,
˜ 
(ˆ 
−1(00)00)  ˜ 
(ˆ 
−1(0)) and ˜ 
 (ˆ 
−1(00)00)  ˜ 
 (ˆ 
−1(0)0),p r o v i n gt h ea b o v e
inequality. Hence the the equilibrium share 00




For  outside the interval (
+
),t h ea r g u m e n t sa r et h es a m ea sC a s e1 .
Given ¯ ¯ min,t h ep o i n t deﬁned in the statement of the proposition satisﬁes  
+
.
For all  ∈ (
+
),a l lt h ep o i n t so nt h e◦∗
 c u r v ea r et ot h el e f to ft h eˆ  curve, ˆ (◦∗
 ()).
For all these points, ﬁrms strictly prefer specialization ov e ri n t e g r a t i o na n dw eh a v el a b o r -
33market clearing, so each pair (◦∗
 ()) is equilibrium with  =0 .T h i s i s t h e t y p e 
equilibrium.
To construct the other two equilibria, we need to consider three diﬀerent subcases.
The ﬁrst subcase is ◦∗
 ≤ ◦
min.T h e n 
+




min,f o r ∈
(
+
). Note that for all such ,a l lt h ep o i n t so n◦∗
 are to the right of the ˆ  curve,
ˆ (◦∗
),s oﬁrms strictly prefer vertical integration. The points in this region are
type  equilibria, with  =1 . Next, for this range of  deﬁne ◦ =ˆ 
−1(),w h e r e
◦∗
 ()  ◦  ◦∗
. Letting 
 solve (47), this is a partial integration equilibrium. That











),t h e and  equilibria are
constructed the same in the ﬁrst subcase. For  ∈ (min
+
), there are two points on the
ˆ  curve between ◦∗
 and ◦∗
. Formally, for such  there exists a ◦ and a ◦ such that
 =ˆ (◦)=ˆ (◦) and ◦∗
 ()  ◦  ◦  ◦∗
.P i c k
 and 







.T h e nf o r ∈ (min
+
) there are two partial
equilibria analogous to that described in the previous case. For 
+
, we are back to the
case of a unique equilibrium.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .













Note that in constructing the equilibrium, we are taking a convex combination of the equilib-
ria of the only-specialization and only-integration regimes. For each extreme case the return
to rent-seeking is ◦ and so this is also the return to rent-seeking in the convex combination.
To simplify, we express 
, 
,a n d◦
 in formulas proportional to ◦
.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w e
use line 2 of (45) to substitute in for 
, and (40) and (46) to substitute in for 
 and ◦
.










































1+◦ +( 1− ) 1
◦+◦1−
.
Inspection of the bottom line shows that this strictly increases in ◦ for ﬁxed .F u r t h e r -
more, it strictly increases in  for ﬁxed ◦.I n c a s e 1 , and ◦ both strictly increase
with  in the partial integration region, so ◦ also strictly increases with .I nc a s e2 ,i n
the region of multiple equilibria, for ﬁxed , equilibria with higher  have higher ◦ and
thus higher ◦. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
Using (40) and (46), we can write production worker demand from the  case as a function




















1−. Hence ˜ ◦
  ˜ ◦






, if and only if ◦  ◦
min. The claims made about uniqueness of equilibria
and the claims made about the comparative statics properties for ◦ and  immediately
follow. The monotonicity of  for Case 1 follows the proof of Proposition 3. As noted in
the text, we use numerical analysis as our basis for the claim that for Case 2,  increases
in  over  ∈ (¯ ). The details of our calculations are available in separate notes.¥
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37Table 1 
How Equilibrium Variables Change When the Economy Moves from  
Complete Vertical Integration to Complete Specialization  
(Point B to Point A in Figure 4) for Various Values of α1, α2 = 1 - α1 











Panel A: α1 = 1.00, α2 = 0.00   
τ (in percent)  15.4 15.1 14.1  14.0
w
o  5.6 5.1 3.5 3.3
w
mean  12.2 10.1 8.0 6.7
Total Wage Bill  87.3 78.5 123.8  103.8
  Intermediate 1 Wage Bill   87.3 78.5 123.8  103.8
      Intermediate 2 Wage Bill  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
Profit 94.4 103.2 139.4  144.0
Total Surplus   181.7 181.8 263.2  247.8
 
Panel B: α1 = 0.80, α2 = 0.20   
τ (in percent)  7.6 6.3 6.3  5.8
w
o  5.5 5.0 2.9 2.8
w
mean  14.4 12.2 7.9 6.9
Total Wage Bill  86.2 79.5 123.2  107.9
  Intermediate 1 Wage Bill   82.0 70.2 114.9  93.1
  Intermediate 2 Wage Bill  4.1 9.4 8.3  14.8
Profit 123.2 134.5 185.1  190.4
Total Surplus  209.4 214.0 308.3  298.3
 
Panel C: α1 = 0.60, α2 = 0.40   
τ (in percent)  1.2 1.0 1.0  0.8
w
o  5.2 5.1 2.5 2.5
w
mean  15.4 14.8 7.5 7.3
Total Wage Bill  80.8 79.5 116.4  113.8
  Intermediate 1 Wage Bill   58.3 51.6 80.5  71.9
  Intermediate 2 Wage Bill  22.5 28.0 35.9  41.9
Profit 153.4 155.9 223.8  224.6
Total Surplus  234.2 235.4 340.2  338.4
 
Panel D: α1 = 0.55, α2 = 0.45   
τ (in percent)  0.3 0.3 0.2  0.2
w
o  5.1 5.1 2.5 2.5
w
mean  15.4 15.2 7.4 7.4
Total Wage Bill  80.0 79.6 115.3  114.6
  Intermediate 1 Wage Bill   49.3 45.8 69.1  64.9
  Intermediate 2 Wage Bill  30.7 33.8 46.2  49.7
Profit 157.8 158.5 228.3  228.5
Total Surplus  237.8 238.1 343.6  343.1Figure 1 
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Case of No Rent Seeking and Large L 
Equilibrium Open-Market Wage and Mean Wage 
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